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1965 War – First ‘Black Elephant’ Armoured Division …

Posted on September 8, 2010. Filed under: From a Services Career |

This is a personal account of the 1965 Indo Pak War seen through the eyes of a young company commander – a Captain in Eighth Garhwalis, 43 Lorried Brigade, First Armoured Division. Events, dates, names, of persons and places, are based on notes made nearer the time. Opinions, observations, assessments are personal. Truth is the one element which has not been allowed to become a casualty.
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In the last week of March 1965 it was towards the end of a candle lit dinner in the lush lawn of the Eighth Garhwali Mess in Jhansi, for which Col Joseph Ephrahaim Jhirad and the 2i/c Maj Abdul Rafey Khan with their gracious and charming lady wives had been invited  by the constantly dueling Ajaib Mangat and self. An urgent call was received from brigade and the CO and self left for a late night conference. The crux was that next day or rather night, we and the whole First Armoured Division would move North to the Jandiala Guru area in Punjab.
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The GOC of  India’s only Armoured Division was Rajinder ‘Sparrow’. He was a simple flamboyant type who  had made a name for himself when General Thimaya ordered him, in the 47/48 war, to carry his Stuarts on trucks and numb the Pakistanis ensconced on the formidable Zojila Pass. It was the highest place tanks had been taken anywhere. Sparrow was a decent type who liked erudition. After retirement he became a Congresswala. My only interaction was when he, as colorful and flashy as ever, publicly commended, during a Divisional training event, what he termed my ‘versatility of exposition’.
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His grade one officer was RPS Randhawa of rock steady stature and commanding presence. The guy had never spoken to me but his eyes conveyed recognition. A hardened Risaldar Major when comparing him with Arun Vaidya, who made Chief, said that when Randhawa was the Commandant of the ACC&S, officers were bone scared to even tip toe behind his vacant office. When Vaidya was Commandant, there was a regular ‘mela cum tamasha’ in parade hours right in front of his office. Much later this imposing and grand officer died tragically on the GT Road while on his way to take over this same division.
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The armoured brigade commander was KK Singh, a quiet sombre  pro of the spartan variety. The lorried brigade had Harbans Dhillon, who was the aloofish sort. The other two units in the brigade were 5 Jat and 5/9 Gurkhas. My coursemate, the portly yet wonderfully agile and quick BK Das, was the Jat adjutant. He was  super sharp and later had even the upright and difficult Gen Raina, who was Chief, eating out of his hand!
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The unit camped on the out skirts of Butari village. Nothing happened over the next few months. In July, the powers that be, moved us to the  filthy, rotten, stench filled noxious fumes in the old deserted derelict part of the Hamira Distillery. It was a living hell. To queer the pitch, my posting to IMA  arrived on the last day of Aug but the Brigade rightly ruled – No Way. But I got my company command.
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During those months, most every day or two, we carried out detailed recces’ of the area South of Amritsar- the Khem Karan Sector. These were mostly with 3^rd Cavalry as we were affiliated with this Regiment. Their Commandant was the sharp, alert, cryptic Salim Caleb, who, poor man, despite his MVC and becoming a Maj Gen, had all through his personal life, a very heavy cross to bear.

Most everybody had plenty of time for Bachan Garewal – the quiet, serious, arrogant, high calibre professional who, due to ill health, was destined to fade and literally pass away as a Station Staff Officer. A year earlier he had in rather cruel fashion, torn apart the CO of 16 Cav, – a Col Sidhu Brar, who was sound as well as a decent gentleman – when the latter was conducting a Div level tactical discussion. There was the young Captain Vadhera, rather like able and lively. Narender Sandhu, who went over to the Dogra’s for his MVC and squeezed more out of it than any one else. CJ Wates, the stylish youngster, who was in the next bed in the Army Hospital in Delhi at war’s end.
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And above all, also of 16 CAV was the inimitable Jojo Sengupta, one of the most genuine and greatest of souls that one can ever meet. He lost both eyes when his Centurion got a direct hit.
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However when the time for fighting came, it was fortunate that 3 CAV with its hardy and robust Centurions, which were the only real match for the Pakistani Pattons, stayed put and helped decimate the Pakistan armored division in the Khem Karan Sector.

In the battalion, the commanding officer, the modest, wholly unassuming but thoroughly professional, Jerry Jhirad, had gone on a bit of hard earned leave. The second in command – the quiet, urbane but solid – Rafey Khan was officiating. The radio news found us rivetted as that was the only source of us getting any news of what was happening out there.

On Sep 2nd the brigade put us on 6 hours notice to go God knew where. Maybe the higher ups were still getting their act together and trying to decide what to do. On the very next day we were put on one hours notice. Rafey Khan went to the brigade for orders and we at last learnt that we were going to Samba near Jammu though we had prepared for the war in the Amritsar area. But thats the way it always is and there were no surprises.

Ravi Mahajan, the suave, super duper professional brigade major, was there on the road watching as we began to move off that night. My company was in the van as Som Jhingons Alpha had gone with some Lancer tanks to guard the Madhopur bridge. These Lancers had had their main armament ‘up gunned’ but it was a pathetic idea because when ever this gun fired, the turret nearly came off – those being the very words of Gui Verma, among other squadron commanders.

We reached our concentration area,  West of Samba, by day break Sep 4. A little later Som Jhingons Alpha joined back and we got busy digging down. Because thats what any good unit does when it has nothing else to do!

To return. It was around 4pm that day that the commander of the  newly formed Corps, General Dunn of the Gurkhas, meandered into the middle of  the sprawled unit. He was as lost as we were and one could hardly blame him. The poor guy was headed for retirement but suddenly found himself raising a Corps HQ for leading a Corps into battle – all courtesy the Pakistani offensive.

Any way, as cheerful and as clueless as any Gurkha, he tried to brief Rafey on the Pak threat and seemed to think that the Ramgarh axis in the 26 Division sector should be reinforced! Evidently neither he nor we seemed to know what really was going on. As thorough professionals, we hardly seemed to care.

On Sep 5, God alone knew why, we moved a few miles to Majua village and began to dig down again and ‘marry up’ with the hapless Second Lancers and their upgunned Shermans. That day Rafey ordered me and my company to go guard the Basantar Bridge while he and the Lancer CO, a Col  Sandhu, went to reconnoitre the area upto the Indo Pak border.

Next day Sep 6th saw me deploying my company in as professional a manner as I could muster in order to see off all threats and hold the bridge safe from danger. I had the footballer cum basketballer, Subedar Rameshwar Singh as my deputy and all he seemed to be worried about was becoming SM after the current one retired. My platoon commanders were young Gurmukh Bal and Havildars Gabar, an AX in Weapons and Sarweshwar Prasad who was actually the Company QM Havildar.

The battalion spent the day in joint recces, planning and rehearsals, while on the bridge, I met a lot of officers going Northward. One such was Gen P Chaudhari, a Garhwali who took pains to talk and spend time with a young Captain.

While on this ‘independent mission’, I was sorely tested to drive to Amarkote some 200 miles South, just to check up on my parents, some six miles short of KhemKaran. I weighed my chances and wisely decided against such foolhardiness. Of course it was mainly because I was not confident of my jeep being able to do it without breading down. It would have been rank foolhardiness which could be termed as desertion of post in time of war, which is just about the  only offence in the Army Act, which has the death penalty!

I later learnt that while my father was in Amarkot, 30 miles South of Amritsar, my mother was that day travelling back from Bhatinda. The bus had off loaded all passengers at Bhikhiwind, some 9 miles short and she had first hitched a ride in a tonga, then on the back of a cycle and then stoutly walked the final miles. Such is the stuff of our stock and the plight of all who live near the international border.

Bravo Company spent a happy two days as being independent has its own highs. On Sep 7 we returned to find that Col Jerry Jhirad had joined back. Initially we had been told that the Division was to be launched on Sep 7 but maybe to coincide with the attack along the Grand Trunk Road, the launch date was moved to Sep 8.

While we chatted in the unit HQ, Som Jhingon suggested that he and I, to mark the occasion, symbolically exchange our pistols. I told him that he was being stupid as his was a 9 mm colt whereas mine was a poor czech Lama. In his usual thumping bravura, he told me to stop being a ‘bania’ specially on such a historic occasion!

In the orders for the offensive, the Commanding Officer ruled that Som Jhingon’s Alpa was to lead the unit with the Lancers on the main thrust line, MAJUA – CHANNI FATOWAL – SAIDANWALI – GANGIAL – SABZIPUR – Cross Rds – KALOI – PAGOWAL.

Bravo was grouped with 62 Cavalry for flank protection on the Right of the main thrust.

Dressed like a christmas tree – what with my compass, binocs and map case, I headed over to the HQ of 62 Cav where I found the Commandant, a Col BM Singh, promenading in the mango grove with his second in command.

The adjustant asked me my buisness but I said it was specifically with his Commandant.  Reluctantly I was ushered into the august presence and he asked as to what he could do for me.

A wee proudly, I announced that I had been put under his command and wanted to know asto where I should locate me and my men in the order of march.  He looked at me rather kindly and casually said that I could bum along in the rear as his tanks woiild blast any and every thing, that came in the way, to kingdom come!

I was taken aback and felt bad that I and my company would be left out of all the glory. But a small voice whispered that this way, I would lose less men and be spared the blood and gore. So, having   taken the time for the advance as 5am, I returned home. That evening the routes were marked.

Late evening the 3 ton lorries drove into the unit area and I got four for the platoons and the HQ. I got no jeep but only a 1 ton for my ‘F’ echelon as Sub Sain Singh, the MT JCO could spare nothing more.

In the evening all officers, major and above had gone to the Division to hear the GOC’s pep talk. When the officers returned I learnt that I had not missed much  because other than seeing the GOC flashing a red scarf and trying to exude confidence, there was little of note.

Early next morning there was a thunderous all mighty roar as our entire artillery opened up withour let up for some 30 mins. I felt glad that I was not at the receiving end but wondered as to what was being hit since we really had no clue as to what exactly was there opposite us. Before the day ended, we would find what our guns had been aimed at and what they had really hit.

We had been up since 3am and were ready to move an hour later.  However when we did try to move just before 5am, there seemed to be far more noise of screeching sherman engines than actual forward movement. This was because on either side of the dirt track, the tanks were churning the mud and rather than going forward, they seemed to be getting stuck deeper and deeper.

The tanks were getting bogged, left right and center, right next to Ranjitpura Farm. In sharp contrast, our 3 ton lorries, were moving easier on the ‘kucha’ track, though they too were at times getting bogged down. The advantage the infantry had was that I could get the troops down so that they could push the lorries as the engines strained.

During a couple of these episodes, I  saw our brigade commander, Harbans Dhillon, drive up in his  jeep, see things for himself and swirl back. In fact I saw him a couple times going forward and back. And the guys in the back seat were carrying some live fowl, most probably his dinner! An army sure marches on its belly!

As day broke and the sun began to come up, we were still near our assembly or forward assembly area. call it what you will. We  had hardly begun the move to cover the seven or eight miles to the international border which we were supposed to have crossed at 6am.

It was around then that the Pak air force showed up. The sabres had a field day while the F104s, some four of them, circled high above. The sabres in their dives, started to pick up both tanks and vehicles at will. Had they been any better, our offensive would have ended there and then.

I recollect my 1 ton along with the A-1 echelon of 62, being hit. Poor Sub Sain Singh, as sincere as ever, was well nigh in tears  seeing his beloved vehicles  become burning infernos.

I regret I am unable to sufficiently capture the chaos and confusion that prevailed that morning. At one time, when my company had moved far ahead, I felt obliged to call halt and order my men to disembark and move into a mango grove so as to rest and catch up on lost sleep whle we waited for the tanks to come up. And I remembered dear Col BM Singh telling me just yesterday, to bum along in his wake as he blasted everything to kingdom come! This is the way war is, my brothren!

After much time, the armor eventually managed to come up and we covered the few miles in own territory and began to cross the international border but only around 3pm. We had taken some 9 hrs to move seven miles in own territory! Our own sandy and soft ground had militated against our own movement.  So much for whatever recce and preparation that had been carried out.

As I was crossing the border around 3 pm, I see dear old Som Jhingon come alongside and begin lambasting me for being such a slow poke idiot! Totally nonplussed, I railed at him and asked as to what in hell was he doing on my axis and to get the hell off on to his own!

He yells back, again calling me an idiot and saying that as they could not move on their chosen line of thrust, they had been superimposed on the line of thrust of the flank guard! So much for armour flexibility! Not bad decision making at that, then and there!

I first glimpsed the casualties of war as we crossed the Pakistani police post at Saidanwali. The wounded were seen pathetically standing by a broken down vehicle ambulance.

Moving a bit forward we came across the village Charwa, just across the border. It was a large willge and seemed to have been a prosperous one. We saw the deadly effect of our artillery and what they had really been firing at! For want of any information on enemy dispositions, our gallant gunners had  chosen mere villages as targets to showcase their prowess.

We saw the devastation our early morning barrage had caused on unsuspecting civilians and animals.

The village may have been abandoned by the majority but there were still men, women, children and animals – cows, camels, bulls, buffalos and what have you! As we drove thru the stench from the corpses and carcasses, it was too much even for a hardened animal type like me. Most everyone had to muffle their faces to avoid the over powering stench.

And this had been caused by our Corps okf Artillery! The over powering barrage of which may not have harmed a single enemy soldier, let alone any type of vehicle or weapon!

In Artillery we were totally and completely outclassed by the Pakistanis.  And that from Day One and right up to the Cease Fire. Sadly this was both in concept, organization and employment as well as in the type and quantum of equipment and ammunition used with such deadly effect.

The Indian Army learnt about the massed use of this great arm from Pakistan. Included was the seemingly lavish expenditure of the apparently abundant and limitless ammunition.  Then we also learnt a thing or two about the bold, audacious and imaginative use of Observatin Officers and their inclusion in  Stay Behind Parties. Indeed in Artillery, India and Pakistan were not on  the same page. We were mere also rans.

But I am going ahead. It is only the first day and we had not had a shot fired at us in anger. Any way, as night fell we went into harbor near Sangial village, and I, without awaiting orders, rejoined my battalion. It was good to be home. More so in enemy country.

And so ended the First Day of our great Armoured Division’s offensive. Thereafter it did little except to be held up by a Recce and Support Battalion which was soon reinforced by a   Armd Regt!

As regards the actions of elements of this Division, the Gatt Affair and the Buttur Do Grandi butchery are covered in separate posts. The only action I have not covered is of the Phillora Cross Roads..

EIGHTH GARHWALIS.

The CO, Jerry Jhirad, the Second in Command, Rafey Khan and OC Alpha Company, the ebullient Som Jhingon and Capt Sonkar, the RMO, were great soldiers and individuals, before and during the entire war and any which where.

They can with ease and aplomb hold their own in any group of great humans and professionals. They led from up front and were, in their own ways, outstanding personalities.

JOSEPH EPHRAIM JHIRAD

Jerry was a thorough bred, top notch professional with an impeccable record and one who craved professionalism. I had a feeling that he was deeply disturbed by the lost, confused, amateurish way we were fighting the war. The smiles were rarer, mostly he seemed somber. Perhaps he saw no method in the madness of our activity.

No wonder, when ever I saw Jerry in the unit HQ near the stench filled well outside Kaloi or at other places, he was always trying his level best to appear cheerful so as to inspire confidence regarding what we were being asked to do. Somber, yes. confused, never.

When one reads about the units doings in this war, one will commiserate with what Jerry had to put up with – specially from the Indian high command.

ABDUL RAFEY KHAN

Rafey was steady, sober, sensible – as always. He came from the aristocratic Rampur family a member of which became the Pakistani Foreign Minister. His father had been deputy commissioner at Pauri Garhwal and had shot with the great Jim Corbett.

Rafey was polished, poised, practical and professional. He knew no fear. Though later, in my view, he seemed to have a premonition that he was not going to make it. I held him in great admiration and he on his part, he did not think of me entirely as a clown.

I remember, may be it was on 9 Sep, when my company was resting in the compound of a brick built school, outside the mud built houses of a fairly large village, probably Maharajke. The boys had loosened their gear and were catching up on their rest.
Rafey was in my company and was watching the village. He saw a soldier couple hundred yards away squatting with his back to the mud wall and asked if it could be ours? I was not too interested as it was no one from my company.

Just then a shell landed and the guy seemed to disappear. On Rafey’s urging, I tasked the nearest section to check out the guy. Before the men could put on their gear, Rafey, with out belt or hat with cigarette in mouth, begins to walk towards the village.I grabbed an SLR and joined him. We crossed an empty 3 ton with the driver dead, seemingly from a heart attack.

As sounds of firing still came from the village, I kept my eyes peeled. The guy, apart from being covered by dust, was uninjured. I gave him a piece of my mind and ordered him to get the hell back to his subunit.

Rafey was always doing stuff like that.

Once when my company was occupying a position near Phillaura cross roads, Rafey was going around and I remember him pointing out a guy, who was standing in a trench with his rifle at the ready. Yet the guy was stone dead and without any wound. May be of a heart attack.

A day or two after the Gatt Affair, the unit was deployed near Kaloi. It was a tense time and Suresh’s Delta wanted my RL as it thought it faced a more imminent anti tank threat. I rated the RL a useless weapon as it was more prone to misfire than fire. Still only after Rafey’s approval, did I give it.

In the evening Rafey comes to my Company and says that we must lift up the morale after the humiliating withdrawal from Gatt. He suggests that since I am Mortar qualified, I add a 1000 yds and in the twilight start pooping off a few rounds as if registering DFs. Just to raise morale. What Fun!

The evening before we reached our temporary defense position North of Kaloi, we were halted and waiting for Jerry’s return. The food had as usual not fetched up and I had long finished my biscuits. Dear Som was munching to glory and sees me looking away. He nudges me and says, “Take one”. When I demur, he says, ” Have one because later when you have them, I will take ten.” How could one not like the guy?

Near Watchoke, I had located myself at Buttar. Som came over for the morning ablutions and we had a bath at the village well while Bakhtawar tried to shoot some domestic fowl since they gave him the run around.

More on Som when the Gatt Affair is covered as also the advance to Butur Dograndi.

THE UNIT AND ITS ACTIONS

We moved from Sangial, where we had harbored on Sep 8, to Maharajke and Kaloi where we spent seversl days with interludes. There after we danced, it seemed aimlessly between Kaloi, Watchoke, Phillaura Cross Roads and Kalewali.

On Sep 9, Som’s Alpha was grouped with A and B Squadrons of the Lancers which were supported by a battery of the self propelled 101 field regiment. The objective was the village of Parashayan, which was easily taken as it did not seem to be he

From Sep 9 to Sep 15, there was only one real operation which seemed to show sense but that too was aborted as our 62 Cav saw imaginary Pattons. This was the Gatt episode on Sep 10 -12 and is covered in some detail in a separate post.

On Sep 13 and we were relieved by 5/9 Gurkhas at Kaloi and moved to Watchoke. There was some talk of B Coy going with 5 Jats for an attack on Uttar Kalaan but it never materialized.

Scattered on one of the roads leading to the Cross Roads, were jeep trailers, which had not yet been scavenged. It was near this road that lying below his Sherman, to be safe from the shelling, Gui Verma of 2 Lancers perusing a Time Magazine. I asked him to loan it once he had finished.

Early morning of Sep 14 saw us in our forward assembly area at Phillaura Crossroads. While Jerry with Kochar, the battery commander and IO Vijay Chander carried out recce towards Kalewali, we came under severe shelling.

Our aimless, confused hither thither moves were compounded as one night, our brigade HQs was over run. The location was hastily abandoned and Harbans Dhillon Commander 43 Lorried came under an ominous cloud. KK of 1 Armd, whose location he had reached proved of no help.

Of course these things happen in peace and war but no need to take advantage of anothers misfortune.

The Garhwalis eventually harbored in Chakdeo Singh on Sep 15, prior to advance and siezure of Buttur Dograndi next day. But there after we were attacked and ousted and more or less disintegrated with the loss of Jerry Jhirad and Rafi Khan and evacuation of self.

The command then devolved on Som Jhingon. By the way, in the ’71 war too, when Som was the Second in Command and once again became the Commanding officer after the CO broke a leg.

Of the remainder, Bhagwan Mall was with Charlie, Suresh Gupta, who was the senior most after Rafey Khan, was with Delta. The adjutant was Om Sindhu who had taken over from me in April. The Intelligence officer was Vijay Chandra, and Ramesh Joshi, who had  taken over from Ajaib Mangat, was the Quarter Master. My dear friend Harish Rautela was the Fire Brigade Officer to be used as the CO saw fit. He got a Sena Medal for retrieving our Mortars which had been left behind as we got the hell back from GATT when 62 Cav saw Pattons on their   eyelashes.

The newly arrived RMO was Capt M Sonkar, who they said, carried rum in his water bottle. He was surely the bravest of  the brave, as this narrative will show and rightly deserved the Nation’s top award for valor in face of the enemy.

Alas, the poor guy got zilch while it was raining medals for valor on the entire armored corps, courtesy custom, camraderie,  Chaudhari and Chavan!

PAK VERSION OF OPERATIONS As obtained from Pak Sources.

Rajinder Singh Sparrow described 1 Corps task as ‘secure a bridgehead extending to line Bhagowal-Phillora cross roads junction south of Tharoah with a view to advancing to the eastern bank of the MRL canal’ with the possibility of advancing  further to line Dhalewali-Wahulai-Daska-Mandhali’.

The initial objectives of this attack were capturing  Phillora Chawinda and Pagowal areas.

1st Armoured Division was the  spearhead of the Indian offensive. This formation was much weaker in numerical/organisational terms from the 1st Pakistani Armoured Division i.e. having only four tank regiments and four mech/lorried infantry battalions and two brigade headquarters. One armor regt was  taken from 26 Division and assigned to it as the fifth tank regiment

It was tasked  to advance inside Pakistani territory  on general axis Ramgarh-Phillora-Pagowal-Chawinda-MRL from first light 8th September after the 6 Mountain Division had secured the bridgehead in Maharajke-Charwa area.As per the Divisional plan this advance was to be conducted on two axis with 43 Lorried Brigade on the right and 1st Armoured Brigade on the left. The 1st Armoured Division was organised as under –

1st Armoured Brigade:- It consisted of  two tank  regiments (17 Poona Horse, 16 Light Cavalry) one tank squadron (from 62 Cavalry), and one infantry battalion (lorry borne) which was tasked to advance in the first phase on axis Ramgarh-Harbal-Sabzkot-Chobara-Phillora. Tasks/Groupings for operations till MRL canal after capture of Phillora were to be given later.

43 Lorried Brigade:- One tank regiment (2 Lancers), one tank regiment (62 Cavalry)  and two lorried infantry battalions tasked to advance on axis Salehriyah-Saidanwali-Cross roads-Mastpur-Ahmad Pur-Pagowal.

Divisional Reserve:- One tank regiment (4 Hodson’s Horse) and one infantry battalion.

6 Mountain Division:- This division was the principal infantry component of the 1 Corps offensive battle and was tasked to secure the bridgehead inside Pakistani territory from where the 1st Armoured Division was to be launched on the thrust towards MRL canal. Its initial task was to secure the bridgehead in area Maharajke-Charwa and exploit till line Ahmadpur-Nauni. It was tasked to commence the attack at 2300 hours on 7th September 1965.18 It had the following troops for the bridgehead operation:-

69 Mountain Brigade:- The right forward assaulting brigade in the 6 MountainDivision bridgehead operation. It had three battalions and a tank squadron from 62 Cavalry and  was tasked to capture Maharajke area in the first phase of the 1 Corps operation.

99 Mountain Brigade:- The left forward assaulting brigade in the 6 Mountain Division bridgehead operation.It consisted of three infantry battalions  and was tasked to capture Charwa in the Corps phase one.

35 Infantry Brigade:- Originally from 14 Division, this brigade consisted of three infantry battalions and was placed under command 6 Mountain Division specifically for the bridgehead operation. It was the reserve brigade of the 6 Mountain Division and was earmarked for unforeseen tasks.

INDIANK ARMORED DIVISION BREAKS OUT

The Indian 1st Armoured Division which had commenced its advance from the bridgehead secured by the 6 Mountain Division in Charwa-Maharajke area after crossing the international border at 0600 hours on the morning of 8th September.It was advancing  two regiments up; with an inter regiment gap of approximately 3500 to 4000 metres in between,each regiment one squadron up, 16 Light Cavalry supported by a Gurkha infantry battalion on the right,advancing towards Phillora 17   Poona Horse on the left advancing towards Tharoah cross roads.

Both the tank regiments had a clean run during the first 15 kilometres of their advance inside Pakistan. According to the Indian armoured corps historian the Pakistan Air force attacked the leading Indian armour elements at  about 8.40 Am. at Chobara but were unable to hit any tank.

The Indian 16 Light Cavalry advancing two troops up came in contact with elements of R and S and 25 Cavalry’s tanks advancing in extended order towards Chobara without a clue that the Indian 1st Armoured Division was just a few miles away.

25 Cavalry ‘s ‘Bravo Squadron’ commanded by Major Ahmad ,suddenly at approximately 50 to 200 metres ranges at about 0900 or 0945 hours came into contact with two leading tank troops of 16 Light Cavalry. Some of Ahmad’s tanks had taken fire positions while some were in the open. The Indians were on the move. A confused firefight followed in which both sides lost tanks, Pattons burning on being hit while Centurions getting shot through both sides!

Both the Indian leading tank troop leaders were killed, thus leaving the leading squadron commander of 16 Light Cavalry clueless. Major Ahmad of 25 Cavalry carried the day by fighting from the front, thus inspiring his men. It was during this firefight that Major Ahmad, who was also severely burnt. There is no doubt that it was Major Ahmad who saved the Pakistani position at Gadgor by fighting from the front.

16 Light Cavalry CO tried to bring up another squadron, commanded by an Indian Muslim officer Major M.A.R Shiekh to outflank the Pakistani position from the the east. Space for manoeuvre was extremely limited Poona Horse the left forward Indian unit being just 4000 metres away. This squadron exposed its flanks to 25 Cavalry tanks of ‘ Alpha Squadron’ losing many tanks including that of Major Shiekh who died on the spot.

Finally  this second squadron was held up having lost its squadron commander and unable to manoeuvre due to limited visibility.

16 Light Cavalry’s advance was checked at Gadgor by 1000 hours 8th September. 17 Poona Horse which was advancing on the left towards Tharoah commenced its advance two squadrons up but soon changed to one squadron up because of the limited fields of fire and observation that made command and control extremely difficult. It came in contact with 25 Cavalry at 0945 hours in Tharoh area and was also checked like 16 Light Cavalry. According to Indian sources some firing took place in between the tanks of 16 Light Cavalry and 17  Poona Horse.

This happened because the inter regiment gap between both the regiments was too small. 62 Cavalry which was tasked to provide left flank protection to the 1st Armoured Division’s advance was delayed as its tanks got bogged down while inside Indian territory. When half of this squadron did finally get going and crossed the border at 1300 hours it went south towards Zafarwal by some misunderstanding after crossing the Degh Nala instead of advancing parallel and north of the Degh Nala as originally ordered!

This squadron crossed the Degh Nala and reached Zafarwal in Pakistani territory absolutely unopposed and later recrossed the Degh Nala to go north once it probably realised that it was supposed to stay north of Degh Nala! Once this squadron was recrossing the Degh Nala it was engaged by an Indian artillery battery providing fire support to the 1st Armoured brigade,which naturally mistook it for Pakistani tanks seeing it approach from south of Degh Nala.

In turn this squadron also opened fire on the Indian battery which they thought to be a Pakistani battery destroying several guns and vehicles! By 1300 hours Brigadier K.K Singh Commander 1st Armoured Brigade was a mentally defeated man. He reached the conclusion that he was held up by at least two Patton regiments and that there was no possibility of advancing direct towards Phillora without suffering unacceptable losses’

All this was happening at a time when there was just 25 Cavalry in front of the whole 1st Indian Armoured Division! The readers may note that the Indians were not lacking in valour but were phenomenally incompetent at unit and brigade level.

Their right forward unit 17 Poona Horse could have easily outflanked 25 Cavalry’s ‘Alpha Squadron’. Major Shamshad a direct participant thus rightly observed that ‘There is a big gap, about six miles wide, between Hasri Nala and Degh Nala which could have provided a safe passage to 17 Poona Horse up to Pasrur. No troops were deployed to defend this area

It may be noted that the 43 Lorried Brigade advance on the other axis also was a disaster due to poor and inefficient execution. The 43 Lorried Brigade which was supposed to commence advance at 0600 hours commenced advance five hours late.

43 Lorried Brigade led by 2 Lancers finally reached Sabzpir cross roads at 1530 hours!

Gen Rajinder Sparrow’s verdict on the Indian 1st Armoured Division’s performance is worth quoting and is also a tribute to 25 Cavalry and sub units of Rand S bn, the only unit of the Pakistan Army that did on 8th September 1965 what no other unit of Pakistan Army ever did. He wrote;

‘The first days battle could not have got off to a  worse start. The Armoured Brigade had been blocked by two squadrons of Pattons and in the first encounter the brigade had lost more tanks than the enemy – whole of 1 Corps had gained a few kilometres.

The worst consequence of the days battle was its paralysing effect on the minds of the higher commanders. It took them another 48 hours to contemplate the next offensive move. This interval gave the Pakistanis time to move up and deploy their 6 Armoured Division with five additional armoured regiments.

In fact the golden opportunity that fate had offered to the 1st Armoured division to make worthwhile gains had been irretrievably lost’

Gen Harbaksh has accurately summed up the Indian failure; ‘both 16 Cavalry and 17 Horse failed to determine the strength of the opposing armour and displayed little skill in outmanoeuvring it… the Brigade Commander made the unfortunate decision to withdraw 17 Horse from Tharoah for countering an alleged serious tank threat on the Left flank.

This was a grave error of judgement as 4 Horse which by this time had been released to the Brigade by GOC 1 Armoured Division, could have been used to meet any flank threat posed by the enemy armour. The blunder cost us dearly. We made an advance of only four miles beyond the bridgehead when a much deeper penetration could have been achieved. The fleeting chance that could have been exploited to gain a striking success, was lost forever….

And while we were fumbling about ineffectively in a chaotic situation of our own creation, the enemy had that vital breathing space so essential for a quick rally round from the stunning impact of surprise. We courted a serious setback through faulty decision and immature handling of armour which the enemy was not slow to exploit.

From now onwards,the thrust intended to keep the enemy off balance and reeling until the final blow by sheer speed of advance, turned into a slow slogging match—a series of  battering-ram actions’.

“I have not come across any finer summing up of the Battle of Indian Offensive than the one done by Harbaksh Singh. I have specifically quoted it to show that 8th September was the most critical day of the otherwise long series of actions around Chawinda which dragged on till cease-fire on 22 September 1965” writes a Major in his book.

‘It was on 8th September or on 9th when the Indians could have easily outflanked the Pakistanis at Chawinda, had their higher armour commanders not been paralysed into a state of inertia indecision and inaction because of 25 Cavalry’s memorable extended line stand in Gadgor area’. Major Shamshad states that ‘Instead of wasting two days in planning, If Poona Horse had advanced from Dugri to Shehzada and captured Pasroor on 9th we would have been in serious trouble. Alternatively, 2 Royal Lancers could have moved unopposed from Bhagowal to Badiana and cut Sialkot-Pasrur Road’.

After 9th September when the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division beefed up Pakistani strength it was no superior generalship but simple, unimaginative frontal battle with both sides having equal number of tanks.

Operational Situation on 9th and 10th September:– The Indians had not suffered a physical defeat on 8th September.It was their higher command that was afflicted by paralysis and in this state they ‘exaggerated’ dimensions of the force in front of them and imagined something much larger than one battered regiment in front of them!

On 9th September they had two absolutely fresh regiments (4 Horse and 2 Lancers), one reasonably fresh regiment (62 Cavalry), and two regiments with relatively weaker tank strength against 25 Cavalry whose tank strength was down to two tank squadrons. In infantry they were vastly superior having twelve battalions against one. Had they possessed a resolute general nothing could have stopped them, not even Tikka Khan projected by Shaukat as ‘one known for his firmness and endurance’.

But their brigade divisional and corps headquarters was paralysed due to the trauma of Gadgor! In words of the Indian armoured corps historian on 9th and 10th September ‘The 1st Armoured Brigade with its three Centurion regiments and its motor battalion remained ‘boxed’ in its defensive position during these two days’.

25 Cavalry found the Indian Operation Order regarding ‘Operation Nepal’ (the 1 Corps Offensive) in one of the abandoned/hit tank of 16 Light Cavalry and came to know  that the formations opposite them were the Indian 1st Armoured Division, 6 Mountain Division and 14 Division and that these were functioning as part of 1 Indian Corps.

This operation order enabled the Pakistani High Command to understand the entire Indian plan aimed at destruction of the 6 Armoured Division and the fact that Chawinda was on the axis of the main Indian line of advance. The 6 Armoured Division whose headquarters were located at Bhalowali east of MRL  was alerted in the evening of 8th September and assigned the mission ‘be prepared to destroy enemy penetration in area east of MRL canal,on further orders’ -Shaukat Riza.

And so it goes ……………….

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